The crazy Pat wins masks a greater stink.

[Pappy13]

So then 2 questions.
1) What is the league wide rate of conversion of 4th and 4?
2) What is Miami's rate of conversion for 4th and 4?

The 1st question would be relevant to the league in general whereas the 2nd question is relevant just to Miami.

But just for the sake of argument let's say that Miami's rate of conversion for 4th and 4 is 50%. Miami would have basically been doing a coin flip on the outcome of the game rather then giving their defense a chance to do it's job. Not sure I agree with you that is the preferred approach no matter how bad your defense is and I can certainly understand why coaches are reluctant to risk it all on a coinflip. They would prefer to trust their punt team and defense.

If it'd been 4th and 1 or they would have been on New England's side of the field I think Gase would have went for it.

[Dave Gray]

I looked up the 3rd down rates, because there's a lot of data on it and it's effectively 4th down, because you punt on 4th down anyway.  I don't have the 4th down data, but even if I did, I think it's less valuable, because it'll be a super-small sample size and most 4th down attempts are under weird circumstances, with many coming at the end of the half or the game and not indicative of a normal play.

This site is interesting: http://www.advancedfootballanalytics.com/index.php/home/research/game-strategy/120-4th-down-study

And specifically this picture:

This basically shows how just the math works out.   Go for it on 4th and 1 anywhere on the field.  But at the 40 yard line, you should even be going for it on 4th and 11.  Of course, this chart isn't time-specific.

[Pappy13]

According to that chart Miami did what it should have which is punt since they were 60 yards away and it was 4th and 4.

[Dave Gray]

^ This chart doesn't apply to the Miami situation, since the argument to go for it was time/score based.  The article specifically uses this chart to define "normal" situations. 

This chart is saying that you should go for it on 4th and 3 from 60 yards out, in the middle of the first quarter -- time and score not withstanding.

[Pappy13]

^ This chart doesn't apply to the Miami situation, since the argument to go for it was time/score based.  The article specifically uses this chart to define "normal" situations.  

This chart is saying that you should go for it on 4th and 3 from 60 yards out, in the middle of the first quarter -- time and score not withstanding.

Ah so you're not saying that Gase did the wrong thing because of analytics, he did the wrong thing because it was the 4th quarter with 4 and half minutes to go in the game analytics be damned! I misunderstood. In my opinion the analytics are your guide and you only deviate from the guide when you have no other choice. Clearly there was another choice.

[Dave Gray]

Ah so you're not saying that Gase did the wrong thing because of analytics, he did the wrong thing because it was the 4th quarter with 4 and half minutes to go in the game analytics be damned!

I feel that Gase made the wrong choice in this situation because there wasn't time to correct.  I wouldn't be bitching about punting from 70 yards out if it were the middle of the 2nd quarter.  I also wouldn't be bitching about it if we'd had the lead.

In this case, it was circumstantial.  But while searching for conversion rates to help illuminate my position, I ran across this chart.  ...which is also something I think has merit.

[CF DolFan]

I think it was circumstantial in the fact our defense sucks. The odds of us getting a first down were better than our defense stopping New England in time for us to score again. Outside of a less than 1% play working ... I'd have been right.

[Pappy13]

I think it was circumstantial in the fact our defense sucks. The odds of us getting a first down were better than our defense stopping New England in time for us to score again. Outside of a less than 1% play working ... I'd have been right.

But then again there was a questionable PI call that got NE inside the 10 as well. If that doesn't happen maybe Miami forces a punt and they are only down 2 points and just need to drive for a winning FG. The odds of that happening are MUCH better. Maybe they still lose, but maybe not. My point is that it's not right to say that we needed a 1% chance play of working because at the time they punted they didn't know that. The game was still very much up for grabs by either team. What happened AFTER the punt made a HUGE difference in needing that 1 play and a BIG part of that was the PI call and that could have just as easily been allowed. That play changes the whole dynamics of the last 2 minutes of the game, not the punt at 4:30 left.

[Dave Gray]

I saw the Seattle Seahawks continue to do this and lose to the Niners.  It's just crazy.  They kept pinning them at the 1 over and over, rather than getting 4 yards and some points.  Lost to a turd team in OT because they kept trying to extend the game.

[Pappy13]

And then there's the Cowboys that kept going for it on 4th down and not making it and lost. The Dolphins went for it on 4th down and were sacked which made the final score look even more lopsided. Giants went for it on 4th and 4 from the 4 yard line and failed to make a TD and lost.  Every week you can go through the box scores and find games where teams went for it on 4th down and lost. It works both ways, it's just that people always think when they lose the other thing would have made it a win. That's a complete fallacy.

[Dave Gray]

The Dolphins went for it on 4th down and were sacked which made the final score look even more lopsided.

This statement sums up what I'm thinking about.  Who cares if a loss is lopsided?  This isn't college.  Play to give yourself a chance to win.  If you don't win, OK.

[CF DolFan]

This statement sums up what I'm thinking about.  Who cares if a loss is lopsided?  This isn't college.  Play to give yourself a chance to win.  If you don't win, OK.

Bookies care! Bookies lives matter too!

[Pappy13]

This statement sums up what I'm thinking about.  Who cares if a loss is lopsided?  This isn't college.  Play to give yourself a chance to win.  If you don't win, OK.

Sometimes punting GIVES you the best chance to win. Doesn't mean you will win or that if you don't you will lose, but it may give you the best chance. Your statement "Play to give yourself a chance to win" is inconsistent with your desire to go for it on 4th down more often in my opinion and in the opinion of many coaches. You're absolutely right that it's not college and it's also not high school and it's not Madden either and going for it on 4th down is not a sure fire way of winning games in the NFL. The odds are against you. The only time the odds are with you is if it's 4th and short (like 2 yards or less) or you have a better then average offensive team. Your statement should be more like "Be aggressive regardless of whether it's prudent or not".

[Dave Gray]

I don't agree that the odds are against me.  The odds are very much for me, as evidenced by the chart I showed, if you believe that the data is legit.

[Pappy13]

I don't agree that the odds are against me.  The odds are very much for me, as evidenced by the chart I showed, if you believe that the data is legit.

That's not what the chart indicates. The chart compares the relative advantages/disadvantages of attempting a 1st down on 4th down as opposed to kicking a FG or punting. Obviously since getting a 1st down and keeping possession is better then attempting a FG or punting then you are willing to risk lower odds to gain that advantage. That doesn't mean the odds are with you it simply means the odds of going for it on 4th down may not be much worse then the odds of converting a FG especially the further you are out, the risk is worth the reward. That's why it spikes up in the middle because it means that punting offers very little advantage to simply going for it on 4th down once you are out of FG range. If you don't convert the 4th down all you have lost is a little field position. But the further back you go then punting becomes more advantageous because of the difference in field position. That doesn't mean the chances of getting a 1st down on 4th down are better based on the field position, the chances of going for it on 4th down and converting it are essentially the same EVERYWHERE on the field. I believe you said the league average for 2017 was around 50% for 4th and 4 which means that approximately half the teams have a better chance of failing to convert a 4th and 4 then converting it. The chart shows the relative advantage/disadvantage that is gained/lost by either attempting the 4th down, attempting the FG or punting. The odds play a factor, but it doesn't mean the odds are with you. As I already said for the most part the odds are only with you if it's 4th and short or you are a better then average offensive team. Obviously things like the defense you are playing are also a factor in your odds of making it so you would have to adjust this chart based on your own team's relative success of making a 4th down and the team you are playing against. I believe that is exactly what most coaches do.

Below is the chart that shows your chances of making the 1st down on 4th down which is about 50% league wide at 4th and 4. Under 4 yards to go it's a little better than 50% but not much, it's not until you get to around 2 yards that your chances of making it are about 60% but remember this is league wide so you have to determine if your team is above or below league average and if your opponent is above or below league average to determine if your chances are better then 50/50 over about 2 yards. Now these stats are from 2000-2008 so perhaps it's gotten a little better in the last 10 years as offenses generally speaking have more advantage, but probably not by a large amount. Also note that since this analysis is from 2000-2008 when the starting position after a kickoff was probably about 5 yards less then it is today since the touchback now moves the ball to the 25 that would also change the go for it/fg/punt chart as starting position for your opponent would change and thus changes the expected points calculation downward making going for it less beneficial. Also the expected points calculation is gonna be largely effected by the extra point being moved back to where it is as it was pretty much a foregone conclusion during the time of this study and it's a lot different now. All things considered the chart above and below are probably still pretty valid.